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FRAUD ON THE MARKET AND THE
SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF CLASS
ACTIONS
ZACHARY ALAN STARR*
INTRODUCTION
To state a claim under rule 10b-5,1 promulgated under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 a plaintiff must
allege
(1) damages (2) caused by his reliance, (3) on defendants' misrep-
resentations or omissions of material facts, or on a scheme by de-
fendants to defraud, (4) made with an intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud, (5) in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, and (6) furthered by defendants' use of the mails or
any facility of a national securities exchange.-
* Member of the firm of Goodkind, Labaton & Rudoff. B.A. 1971, Colgate; M.A. 1976,
Brandeis; J.D. 1980, Hofstra University.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1988). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
, See Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Reck-
lessness, as opposed to actual intent to deceive, may suffice to establish a defendant's liabil-
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The "fraud-on-the-market" theory has been used in rule 10b-5 lit-
igation with regard to the second element to create a rebuttable
presumption of reliance on a defendant's misrepresentations.
The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the premise that
the price of actively traded securities, or, more precisely, securities
traded on efficient capital markets,4 reflects all relevant publicly
available information. 5 Consequently, relevant misrepresentations
defraud investors who trade on efficient markets, regardless of
whether the investors directly rely on the misrepresentations, be-
cause they unfairly affect the market price of securities.6
Confronted with the plaintiff's need in a rule 10b-5 class ac-
tion to demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation, courts have
presumed that investors rely on the market price of actively traded
securities being validly set or an indication of the stock's intrinsic
ity. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.) (recklessness in defendant's
evaluation of status of stock), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
" An "efficient" market has been characterized as one in which available information of
cognizable value is immediately reflected in the price of a stock. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383-85 (1970). See gener-
ally Hurley v. FDIC [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,782, at
94,205 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 1989) (holding over-the-counter market is efficient because it "ob-
tains information about a company and accurately reflects that information in the price of
the stock"); Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 912-15 (1989) (examining characteristics that capital mar-
kets must have to qualify as "efficient"); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory and the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a Consistent Standard, 14 J. CORP. L. 443, 472-77
(1988) (outlining "efficient market hypothesis" as applied to securities markets).
See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986); Ballan, 720 F. Supp.
at 251. The so-called "efficient capital markets hypothesis" actually has three "forms":
[T]he weak form of the hypothesis holds that past price movements are incorpo-
rated in prices; the semi-strong form suggests that publicly-available information
is reflected in prices; and the strong form posits that all information from
whatever source is fully incorporated in prices. The empirical evidence to date
(with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and semi-
strong versions but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.
Fischel, supra note 4, at 911; see Macey & Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Anal-
ysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1078-79 (1990) (contending
that in Basic, the Supreme Court "implicitly applied the semi-strong form").
' See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) ("purchaser on the stock
exchanges may be either unaware of a specific false representation, or may not directly rely
on it... whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresenta-
tions"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see also Zlotnick v. Tie Communications, 836 F.2d
818, 822 (3d Cir. 1988) (to extent market price has been artificially inflated by misrepresen-
tations, market price has "been infected by fraud"); Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61 ("misleading
statements will ... defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements [because] . .. [t]he misstatement may affect the price of the stock,
and thus defraud purchasers who rely on the price").
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value.7 Courts further presume, on the basis of the fraud-on-the-
market theory, that investors indirectly rely on all representations
that unfairly affect the market price.8 Use of the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory in this manner was upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.9
7 See Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61; Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 (purchasers generally rely on
stock's price as "reflection of its value"); Ballan, 720 F. Supp. at 251 (investors rely on
integrity of market); Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118 F.R.D. 136, 143 (M.D. Fla.
1987) (average investor "relies on the premise that the market price is validly set"). See
generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) ("hard to imagine that there
ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll
the dice in a crooked crap game?" (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). But see Basic, 485 U.S. at 255-56 (White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (questioning whether investors rely on price as indication of "true
value"). The presumption should appropriately be that purchasers rely on the price being
"validly set," rather than being an indication of the stock's true value. See infra note 83.
8 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 (purchaser on stock exchange "relies generally on the
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations under-
lying the stock price"); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 ("an investor who buys or sells stock
at the price set by the market does so in reliance on integrity of that price. Because most
publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any pub-
lic material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed"). See generally A. BROMBERG
& L. LOWENPELS, SECU~rrIEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6(2), at 212 (1990) (inves-
tor who trades with reference to market price might be said to rely indirectly on
misstatements).
Some courts that invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance appear not to
presume indirect reliance on the misrepresentation, but rather, substitute reliance on the
integrity of the market for reliance on the misrepresentation. See, e.g., Peil, 806 F.2d at
1161 ("purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value"); Note,
The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1146 (1982) (discussing courts'
treatment of reliance on integrity of market as substitute for reliance on defendant's con-
duct). Although the difference may be subtle, it is best to analyze the situation as one of
indirect reliance on the misrepresentation rather than as a substitution of reliance on the
integrity of the market for reliance on the misrepresentation.
9 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). The decision of the Court to uphold the use of the fraud on
the market theory was by a plurality opinion written by Justice Blackmun and joined in by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 226-50. Justice White, joined by Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 250-63. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Since the final vote was only 4-2, it is possible that the issue may be
revisited by a full Court.
The legal commentary on the fraud-on-the-market theory is extensive. See Black,
Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Requirements in Certain Open Mar-
ket Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 435 (1984); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982); Macey
& Miller, supra note 5; Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and "Fraud-on-the-Market"--Heavy Seas Meet
Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 (1982); Note, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: An
Unwise Extension of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1161 (1989); Note,
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1964 (1989);
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In Basic, the Court emphasized the importance of the "fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance" for class action litigation.
Specifically, the Court recognized that, in the absence of a pre-
sumption of reliance, each class member would individually have
to prove reliance on the relevant misrepresentation, making the el-
ement of reliance an individual question which might overwhelm,
or "predominate" over, common questions. 10 Predomination of in-
dividual elements, in turn, precludes class certification by prevent-
ing the satisfaction of the class certification requirement that com-
mon elements of law and fact predominate over individual
elements."
Following the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion of reliance, defendants have sought to defeat class certification
by rebutting the presumption of reliance. In cases involving effi-
cient markets, this attempt has taken two general forms.' 2 Some
Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982); Note, supra note 8; Note, The Fraud on the Market The-
ory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70 IowA L. REV. 975
(1985); Comment, The Fraud on the Market Theory: The Debate Rages On, 27 DuQ. L.
REV. 277 (1989).
10 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. At least one court has in fact stated that class certification in
Rule lob-5 class actions should be denied where reliance is an individual issue. Gibb v.
Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 66 (N.D. Tex. 1984) ("As long as reliance remains an issue,
it predominates over common questions of law or fact, thus precluding maintenance as a
class action of plaintiffs' claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); see also Sanders v.
Robinson Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (each class
member must prove individual reliance on misrepresentations, making certification as class
action "highly inappropriate"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). More typically, Rule 10b-
5 class actions are certified despite individual issues of reliance. See, e.g., Data Access Sys.
Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 139, 142 (D.N.J. 1984) (if plaintiffs' differing "modes of reliance"
were allowed to defeat class certification, "there could never be a class action of securities
purchasers"), rev'd on other grounds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d.Cir. 1988); Muth v. Dechert, Price
& Rhoads, 70 F.R.D. 602, 607 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (despite individualized issues, class action
appropriate where there is "crucial core allegation of a common course of conduct that
yields predominant common questions").
Although Rule 10b-5 class actions may thus be certified without resort to the fraud on
the market presumption of reliance, the fraud-on-the-market theory in connection with the
substantive theory of class actions nevertheless provides a more satisfactory framework for
analyzing the reliance question in securities class actions.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
Id.
12 Defendants may also contend that the relevant security was not traded on an effi-
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defendants have contended that the plaintiff seeking to represent
the class was not entitled to rely on the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption of reliance because that plaintiff had not considered the
price of the security in making the relevant investment decision
and consequently that the plaintiff could not be certified as the
class representative. 3 Other defendants have contended that the
class as a whole was not entitled to the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption of reliance because the alleged misrepresentations did
not in fact affect the market price of the relevant security.14
In addition, some courts have suggested that proof of direct
reliance on the misrepresentation and proof of indirect reliance by
means of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance are mu-
tually exclusive alternatives.15 Thus, class members who relied di-
cient market. See, e.g., Labin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1445 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
("fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption does not apply where, as here, securities have
not been purchased on an impersonal market"); A&J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,938, at 94,583 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22,
1986) (defendants opposed class certification on grounds market not efficient; thus individ-
ual reliance had to be shown causing individual issues to predominate).
1- See Berman v. Entertainment Mktg., Inc., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,905, at 95,009 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1990) (defendants argued "that the pre-
sumption can be rebutted as to plaintiff ... and thus he is not typical of 'the fraud on the
market' plaintiff"); Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118 F.R.D. 136, 147 (M.D. Fla.
1987); Katz v. Comdisco, 117 F.R.D. 403, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (defendants argued that
named plaintiff was "speculator who did not rely on the integrity of the market"); Grossman
v. Waste Management, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 781, 788 (N.D. M. 1984) (proof of defendant's reli-
ance on factors entraneous to market may rebut presumption of reliance); Cohen v. Laiti, 98
F.R.D. 581, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331,
337 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("courts have recognized that the defense of nonreliance on the integrity
of the market when raised against the named plaintiff in a fraud on the market case may
destroy the typicality of his or her claims"); Kline v. Wolf, 88 F.R.D. 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (defendants disputed plaintiffs' claims that they relied on integrity of market); see
also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
14 See In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 638 (D.N.J. 1988) (defendant
argued that presumption of reliance was rebutted because accurate information existed in
marketplace); Home Shopping Network Sec. Litig.-Class Action II, 1084-Civ.-T-15B, De-
fendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at
11-22 (M.D. Fla. April 20, 1990) (defendants contended that "'fraud on the market theory'
does not apply to the instant case since all of the material information allegedly omitted by
[defendant] nonetheless was available to the market").
" Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (fraud-on-
the-market theory and claim that publicly available information did not reach plaintiff are
two "logically inconsistent" contentions); Berman, T 94,905, at 95,008 n.2 ("this Court ques-
tions whether a plaintiff who directly relies on the statements may also be entitled to the
fraud on the market presumption"); see also McNichols, 97 F.R.D. at 341 (claims of individ-
ual misrepresentation have no place in fraud-on-the-market case). But see Anderson, 118
F.R.D. at 147 (fact that some named plaintiffs had claims based on fraud-on-the-market
theory while others had claims based on direct reliance did not preclude class certification).
1991]
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rectly on the misrepresentation are seen as different from, and per-
haps in conflict with, class members who indirectly relied on the
misrepresentation as a result of their reliance on the integrity of
the market.1 6 Such conflicts could serve to preclude, or at least
limit, a Rule 10b-5 class action.17
Courts have also held that use of the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption of reliance "does not apply to . . . common law fraud
claims." ' According to such courts, state law claims for common-
law fraud or negligent misrepresentation, require a showing of "ac-
tual and justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations by
each plaintiff.""9 The refusal to apply the fraud-on-the-market
theory to state law claims, and the corresponding requirement that
each class member individually prove the reliance element of a
state law claim, often prevents class certification of such claims."0
10 Berman, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,905 at 95,009.
"[11f it should later appear that plaintiff is not entitled to the fraud on the market presump-
tion and the remaining plaintiffs are entitled to that presumption, then plaintiff may have a
conflict with the remaining class members." Id.
17 Among the requirements for class certification are that the class representative (i)
have claims that are typical of the claims of the class (the "typicality requirement"), and (ii)
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (the "adequacy requirement").
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Where the claims of the class representative are determined to he
significantly different from, or in conflict with, those of other class members, the court may
determine that the typicality and adequacy requirements are not satisfied, and, therefore
may deny class certification. See, e.g., Spivak v. Petro-Lewis Corp., 118 F.R.D. 504, 509 (D.
Colo. 1987) (nontendering shareholders' claims were not typical of those of tendering share-
holders and former could not adequately represent latter). Alternatively, the court may act
under Rule 23(c)(4) to limit the class action to the particular claims of the class representa-
tive. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
"a Victor v. White, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,548, at 93,510
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 1989); accord Good v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 751 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D.
Ill. 1990); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 279 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Tolan v.
Computervision, 696 F. Supp. 771, 772 (D. Mass. 1988); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin.
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 642, 649 (M.D. Pa. 1988). But see Altantic Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., [1989-
1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,644, at 97,991 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1990)
(trend of courts in securities cases, even with common-law claims, shifting to favor fraud on
the market); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,485, at 94,822 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 1989) (plaintiffs may plead "reliance on the integrity of
the market" rather than actual reliance when claiming fraud, deceit, negligence and negli-
gent misrepresentation); In re Seagate Techs. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D. 264, 270-71 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
11 In re 3 Commercial Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,270, at 96,210 (N.D. Cal, 1990) (emphasis added); accord Good, 751 F. Supp. at 1323.
"0 See In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 125 F.R.D. 625, 636
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 412 (N.D. Il. 1987); Gavron v.
Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1987). But see Keyser, 121 F.R.D. at
649 (although fraud on the market "unavailable" for common law securities claims, individ-
ual questions of reliance did not defeat class certification).
FRAUD ON THE MARKET
This Article focuses on the use of the fraud-on-the-market
theory in the class action context. It is a primary contention that,
in a class action, the fraud-on-the-market theory is best applied in
connection with a substantive theory of class action suits. The sub-
stantive theory of class actions not only justifies application of the
fraud-on-the-market theory in securities class actions, but provides
the most useful theoretical framework for analyzing class certifica-
tion issues arising from such application. Under the substantive
theory of class actions, the fraud-on-the-market theory is not
viewed as creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance, and proof
of a fraud-on-the-market is not, strictly speaking, viewed as a sub-
stitute for proof of reliance on the misrepresentations. Rather, the
fraud-on-the-market theory is viewed as providing a satisfactory
and appropriate way of satisfying the element of reliance on a
class-wide basis, in that proof of a fraud on the market is viewed as
constituting, for the class as a whole, proof of reliance on the
misrepresentation.
Part One of this Article describes the manner in which courts
have used the fraud-on-the-market theory in connection with the
reliance element in securities class actions under rule 10b-5 to cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Part Two describes the
substantive theory of class actions and analyzes the fraud-on-the-
market theory with reference to such theory of class actions. It is
contended that, in a class action, reliance on a misrepresentation
may be established on a classwide basis by proving that the market
price of a security was artificially inflated by the misrepresenta-
tion." Under the substantive theory of class actions, such class-
wide proof of reliance is justified by the underlying policy objec-
tives of a private action under rule 10b-5. Part Three demonstrates
how difficulties that arise when the fraud-on-the-market theory is
used to create a rebuttable presumption of reliance may be over-
come when the fraud is used in the context of a substantive theory
of class actions to prove reliance on a classwide basis. Part Four
considers the fraud-on-the-market theory in the context of state
law claims, and contends that the underlying policy objectives of
fraud and negligent misrepresentation justify the use of class-wide
proof of reliance for state law, as well as rule 10b-5, claims.
21 For convenience, this Article focuses on instances wherein misrepresentations artifi-
cially inflate the market price of a security. Parallel arguments apply where misrepresenta-
tions artificially deflate the market price of a security.
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I. THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY AND THE RELIANCE
ELEMENT
The fraud-on-the-market theory hypothesizes that the price of
actively traded securities of business entities reflects publicly avail-
able information about such entities. Thus, if the publicly available
information is materially false or misleading, it will be reflected in
the price of the relevant securities.22 More particularly, if publicly
available information about a business entity is unduly optimistic,
or if it fails to include material, adverse facts about the entity, the
price of the entity's securities will trade at a higher price than that
at which they would have otherwise traded, i.e., the price will be
"artificially inflated."
Courts have used the fraud-on-the-market theory in connec-
tion with the reliance element in securities actions under rule 10b-
5.21 In a rule 10b-5 action, the plaintiff must establish reliance on
the alleged material misrepresentation. Courts consistently have
held that, in circumstances in which the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory is applicable, "proof of subjective reliance on particular mis-
representations is unnecessary to establish a Rule 10b-5 claim. '24
In these cases, although a purchaser may not be aware of or rely on
a specific false representation about a business entity, the repre-
sentation may nevertheless artificially inflate -the price of the en-
tity's securities. Inflation generally results whenever investors
purchase in reliance on the false information, since these addi-
tional purchases drive the price of the stock upward.25 Accordingly,
22 Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (result of
misrepresentation is that price of securities will not reflect true value); see also Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) ("In an open and developed market, the dissemi-
nation of material misrepresentations or withholding of material information typically af-
fects the price of the stock").
22 See Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161; Harris v. Union Elec., 787 F.2d 355, 366-67 n.9 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 754 (11th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb,
Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332-1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1026 (1984); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980).
24 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
2" See id. (reliance of some market traders can cause inflation in stock price); see also
Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162 (material misrepresentations or omissions likely to influence buyers
and sellers and thus market). The market traders need not have relied directly on the false
information, but indirectly through statements of securities analysts, brokers, or others.
Grossman, 100 F.R.D. at 788-89. This type of indirect reliance should be distinguished from
indirect reliance based on the fraud on the market theory. This Article includes the former
[Vol. 65:441
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so long as the deception has influenced enough individuals to have
affected the price, any investor who has, in reaching his investment
decision, relied on the price having been validly set, that is, who
relied on the "integrity of the market," is presumed to have indi-
rectly relied on the misrepresentation. As explained in Blackie v.
Barrack:26
A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a
specific false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he
may purchase because of a favorable price trend, price earnings
ratio, or some other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on
the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no
unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and
thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the
stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays
reflects material misrepresentations. 27
Use of the fraud-on-the-market theory in connection with the
reliance requirement of a rule 10b-5 action has occurred primarily,
if not exclusively, in the class action context. Courts have recog-
nized that if each class member individually had to establish sub-
jective or direct reliance on the material misrepresentation, the
utility of the class action device, and thus the efficiency of the fed-
eral securities laws, would be seriously undermined." Individual-
ized proof of reliance might prevent satisfaction of the class certifi-
cation requirement that common issues predominate, and if class
certification were denied, there would be no viable remedy for vio-
lations of the federal securities laws.29
type of indirect reliance when referring to "direct" reliance.
26 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
27 Id. at 907.
28 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 ("Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member
of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceed-
ing with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common
ones"); see Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88
HARv. L. REV. 584, 596 n.65 (1975).
20 See generally Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.) (empha-
sizing importance of class action device to vindicate securities law claims of small stockhold-
ers), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Peil, 86 F.R.D. at 373 ("to allow various secondary
issues.., to destroy the institution of a class action would render the rule an impotent tool
for private enforcement of the federal securities laws"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985);
Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435, 441 (N.D. Tex. 1975) ("[to] prohibit class treatment in a
securities case would do violence to the remedial nature of the securities acts"); 3 L. Loss,
SEcURITIES REGULATION 1819 (2d ed. 1961) (effectiveness of federal remedies largely depen-
dent on class action device); Note, supra note 28, at 593 (to require proof of actual reliance
"would present an enormous and unwarranted practical barrier to recovery"); Note, The
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Accordingly, courts have long held that in a securities class ac-
tion involving an efficient market, the fraud-on-the-market theory
justifies a presumption of reliance.30 In this manner the reliance
element is prevented from interfering with class certification.3 1
In Basic, the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of
the fraud-on-the-market theory. The Court held that, in a securi-
ties action under rule 10b-5, a fraud on the market, properly al-
leged, establishes a rebuttable presumption of reliance.3 2 In justify-
ing the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the Court
did not distinguish its use in a class action from its use in an indi-
vidual lawsuit. However, Basic was in fact a class action and the
Court recognized that requiring individualized proof of reliance
would have effectively prevented plaintiffs from obtaining class
certification.33
The presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket is "rebuttable." Proof that an individual plaintiff did not rely
on the integrity of the market price of the relevant security, or that
the market price did not reflect the misstatement, is sufficient to
rebut the presumption.3 4
Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CM. L. REV. 337, 345-56 (1971) (discussing
erosion of reliance defense).
30 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. "Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposi-
tion has concluded that where materially misleading statements have been disseminated
into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs
on the integrity of the market price may be presumed." Id.
31 Some commentators have suggested that the creation of a presumption of reliance, in
effect, eliminates the need to prove the element of reliance, and thus, arguably, contravenes
the Supreme Court's authority to prescribe rules of procedure. See Black, supra note 9, at
440 n.21; see also Ross, Rule 23(b) Class Actions-A Matter of "Practice and Procedure" or
"Substantive Right"?, 27 EMORY L.J. 247, 253-56 (1978) (Rule 23 as violative of the Rules
Enabling Act); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1358
(1976) (Rules Enabling Act "does not mandate that federal courts ignore substantive con-
siderations in making procedural decisions). But see Comment, supra note 9, at 281-82 (pro-
cedural rule affecting substantive rights is constitutional if the interference is merely inci-
dental and rule is reasonably necessary to maintain orderly system of rules).
When the fraud on the market theory is not used to create a presumption of reliance
but as a means of proving reliance on a classwide basis so as to best achieve the underlying
policy goals of a Rule 10b-5 action, see infra text accompanying notes 37-51, there can be no
valid charge that an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action has been eliminated. See Note,
Class Action in a Products Liability Context: The Predomination Requirement and Cause-
In-Fact, 7 HOFSTHA L. REv. 859, 885 n.127 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Class Action].
32 Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
33 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
3' As stated in Basic:
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair
FRAUD ON THE MARKET
In the class action context, the use of the fraud-on-the-market
theory to establish a rebuttable presumption of reliance has, to a
large extent, served merely to shift the focus of defendants' objec-
tions to class certification. Before the development and general ac-
ceptance of the fraud-on-the-market's presumption of reliance, de-
fendants often opposed class certification on the ground that each
class member had to prove reliance individually; therefore, it was
argued, individual issues of law and fact predominated over com-
mon issues. Now in a fraud-on-the-market case, defendants fre-
quently oppose class certification on the ground that the class rep-
resentative did not rely on the integrity of the market price in
purchasing the relevant security, and thus cannot use the fraud-
on-the-market theory available to other class members.3 5 In es-
sence, this new attack reestablishes the reliance requirement as an
individual issue. Instead of forcing each class member individually
to establish subjective or direct reliance on the misrepresentation,
class members are forced individually to establish reliance on the
integrity of the market. In addition, defendants have argued that
the fraud-on-the-market theory may not be used to satisfy the pre-
domination requirement where accurate information was available
in the market from third parties.3 6
These new objections to class certification in a securities ac-
tion are inappropriate. Their inappropriateness is best demon-
market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. For example,
if petitioners could show that the "market makers" were privy to the truth about
the merger discussions here with Combustion, and thus that the market price
would not have been affected by their misrepresentations, the causal connection
could be broken: the basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted
through market price would be gone. Similarly, if, despite petitioners' allegedly
fraudulent attempt to manipulate market price, news of the merger discussions
credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those
who traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would have no direct or
indirect connection with the fraud. Petitioners also could rebut the presumption
of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have divested themselves of their Basic
shares without relying on the integrity of the market. For example, a plaintiff who
believed that Basic's statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in
merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic stock was artifi-
cially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated
concerns, e.g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from
shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a
price he knew had been manipulated.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49; see also Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161-63 (3d Cir. 1986)
(explaining what will and will not rebut presumption).
"See supra note 13.
26 See supra note 14.
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strated when the fraud-on-the-market theory is viewed in the con-
text of a general theory of the class action suit. Accordingly, before
the new objections to class certification may be most fruitfully ana-
lyzed, it is first necessary to discuss a general theory of class
actions.
II. THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY OF CLASS ACTIONS AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF CLASS ACTIONS
Of the general, commonly advanced theories of class actions, a
compelling argument has been made that the substantive theory
provides the most satisfactory approach to the contemporary class
action suit.37
The substantive theory maintains as its basic premise that the
most significant function of contemporary class actions is to open
courts to claims not ordinarily litigated because they are not eco-
nomically feasible. This function is achieved by "aggregating sub-
stantially similar claims, thereby prorating the cost of litigation
among numerous litigants." The increased access to courts made
possible by the class suit is itself justified, according to the sub-
stantive approach, because it promotes full realization of substan-
tive policy objectives underlying the claims sought to be enforced
in the class suit.38
From the perspective of the substantive theory, the rule 23 re-
quirement for class certification that common elements of law and
fact predominate over individual elements is satisfied if class certi-
fication furthers the remedial and structural policies underlying
the substantive law upon which the action is based. 9 Remedial
policies are furthered when the overall purposes of the law author-
izing the cause of action are best achieved through class certifica-
"' See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 31, at 1329-72 (isolating
and comparing three theories of class actions).
"8 Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 864; see Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d
1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (one chief goal of Rule 23 is to provide means of redress to plain-
tiffs with small individual claims); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d
Cir.) (class action necessary device for vindicating claims that, individually, would be too
small to warrant litigation), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 484-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (class action proper "where those who have allegedly
been injured 'are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know
enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive' "); Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8. U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 692 (1941) (class suit
as effective for group redress as derivative suit for shareholders).
11 Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 864-65.
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tion. Structural policies are furthered when the elements of the
cause of action are all capable of being proven by general modes of
proof.40 If full compatibility of class action procedures with the re-
medial and structural policies of the underlying cause of action
does not exist (because, for example, some elements cannot be
proven by general modes of proof), the predomination requirement
may nevertheless be satisfied if class certification will achieve a fair
balance among the social values sought to be advanced by the sub-
stantive law on which the cause of action is based.41
With reference to a private cause of action under rule 10b-5,
structural policies are not fully promoted by class certification if
the reliance element may be established only by individual, rather
than general, modes of proof. Conversely, if the reliance element
may be established by general modes of proof, the structural poli-
cies underlying this element are indeed furthered by class certifica-
tion. The fraud-on-the-market theory provides a means for a gen-
eral mode of proving reliance in a rule 10b-5 action. The
appropriateness of employing such means, however, depends on
whether the underlying remedial policy objectives of a cause of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5 will, on balance, be advanced.42
The major remedial policy objectives of a rule 10b-5 private
cause of action are to protect the integrity of the marketplace by
deterring the artificial inflation of securities prices caused by mate-
rial misrepresentations or omissions,43 and to compensate the vic-
tims of securities fraud.44 These objectives are achieved by award-
40 See id. at 865. A "general mode df proof"' refers to proving an element of a cause of
action in a manner applicable to the entire class. An "individual mode of proof" refers to
proving an element of a cause of action in a manner applicable only to an individual mem-
ber of the class. Id.
41 Id. at 865-66.
41 See id. at 873.
" Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46 (policy underlying 1934 Act was to facilitate investor reli-
ance on integrity of market); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963) ("fundamental purpose... was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor'); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 (1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 designed
to keep securities markets "free from fraud").
" See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (in enacting the 1934 Act,
Congress intended, not only to compensate injured investors, but to deter fraudulent and
manipulative practices in securities market and to ensure full disclosure of material infor-
mation); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (in inferring
private right of action for violations of Rule 10b-5, court concluded that Congress intended
original statute to be interpreted as providing for civil suits "for money damages"); A.
JACOBS, LITMATION AND PRACTCE UNDER RULE 10b-5, § 260.03[a], at 11-22 (2d ed. 1991)
(major principles guiding judges in awarding 10b-5 damages are deterrence and compensa-
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:441
ing damages to victims of rule 10b-5 violations. The damages
awarded, however, should not result in "overcompensation" and
"overdeterrence. ' '45  On the other hand, "underdeterrence" of
wrongdoing and "undercompensation" of victims is, clearly, also to
be avoided.46 In order to achieve optimal deterrence, the allocation
of costs to the wrongdoer should be accurate-only those damages
actually caused by the fraud should be allocated to the wrong-
doer.47 The function of the reliance element is to achieve such an
accurate allocation of costs.
48
Arguably, an accurate allocation of costs is achieved when
each individual plaintiff demonstrates a causal link between his or
her loss and the defendant's fraud by proving subjective, direct re-
liance.49 However, the allocational goal of the reliance element can
also be achieved on a classwide basis by use of the general mode of
proof provided by the fraud-on-the-market theory. On the basis of
the fraud-on-the-market theory, the defendants' misrepresenta-
tions are acknowledged to have affected the price of the relevant
tion of victims); Note, supra note 28, at 585 (when courts infer private rights of action from
federal regulatory statute they seek "to compensate those injured by violations" and "to
enhance the prescriptive effect of the regulation itself").
" See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981) (10b-5
plaintiff may only recover actual, and not punitive, damages).
" Randall, 478 U.S. at 664 (deterrence ill served by limiting plaintiffs to recovering
their "net economic" loss). See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 44.
17 Cf. Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 878 (allocation accurate when only costs
relevant to choice between injury and safety are allocated to activity in question).
48 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (reliance provides "causal connection" between defendant's
acts and plaintiff's loss); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986) (reliance is
one part of "ubiquitous requirement" of causal relationship to defendant's acts); Rosenberg
v. Digilla, 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (reliance provides nexus between defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's injury); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 (proof of reliance needed to show
"causal connection" between defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's injury); see Note, Class
Action, supra note 31 at 873, 877-78 (reliance surrogate for "cause-in-fact element").
4" It could be argued, however, that because the modern securities market differs dra-
maticaly from the face-to-face transactions of early fraud cases, Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-44,
an investor bringing an individual action need not establish his own reliance as a causal link
between the misrepresentation and the injury. As long as others relied on the false informa-
tion, a causal link exists. Cf. Dann v. Studebaker, 288 F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1961) (stock-
holder not relying on misleading proxy statement had standing to sue under 1934 Act be-
cause he could suffer "equally damaging injury" to corporate interests if other stockholders
were deceived); accord Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1119 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (1991); Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 427 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319, 1325-26. A stockholder's injury due to deceptive
proxy solicitation may result, "not from the deceit practiced on him alone, but rather from
the deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964).
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stock.50 Therefore, the costs allocable to the defendant may be
based on the impact such fraud had on the price of the relevant
stock. In other words, in those circumstances where a defendant's
misrepresentations have artificially inflated the price of a security
actively traded on the market, a causal link between the misrepre-
sentation and the loss sustained by the class of investors who pur-
chased the security during the relevant time period is
established.51
Viewed in this way, the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory
in connection with the reliance element in a securities class action
under Rule 10b-5 establishes the element of reliance for the class
as a whole by a general mode of proof. Once it is proven that the
market price of a security was artificially inflated by the misrepre-
sentation, reliance on the misrepresentation by the relevant class
of investors is established. The market price of the security could
not have been artificially inflated unless at least some members of
the investment community directly relied on the misinformation.2
Indeed, the amount by which the security was artificially inflated
(multiplied by the appropriate number of shares traded) should
typically constitute the precise amount of damages caused by the
misrepresentation. Thus, it can be argued that use of this general
mode of proving reliance provides a way of achieving the most ac-
curate allocation of costs, and thus, the most nearly optimal
deterrence.
In any event, the allocation of costs is likely to be less accu-
rate, and the deterrence objective less effective, without the gen-
eral mode of proving reliance permitted by the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory. In any securities fraud occurring in the market, most
investors sustain losses too minimal to warrant the very great ex-
pense of an individual suit.5 3 Thus, in the absence of class certifica-
50 See supra notes 6, 25-27 and accompanying text.
51 See generally Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 ("materiality circumstantially establishes the
reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the stock price-when the
purchase is made the causational chain between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's loss is
sufficiently established to make out a prima facie case"); Rosenberg, 648 F. Supp. at 43
(reliance on market's integrity adequately demonstrates causal nexus); Reeder v. Master-
craft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (plaintiffs would not have pur-
chased at artificially inflated price absent misrepresentation); In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61
F.R.D. 88, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (same); Note, supra note 28, at 593 ("proof that the decep-
tion influenced only enough individuals to have produced the adverse effect will establish
causation"); Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 873-74 (same).
62 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
5: Peil v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (because
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tion, all remedial policy goals of a private action under rule 10b-5
may be frustrated; 4 and, in the absence of a general mode of prov-
ing reliance, such actions may be denied class certification. 55
Conversely, use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to prove re-
liance on a class-wide basis will most fully satisfy all policy goals at
stake. By enabling class certification, and thus enabling investors
to bring suit, costs may be allocated to the defendants for their
misrepresentations, investors whose damages were caused by the
misrepresentations may be compensated, and the integrity of the
market may be protected. Use of such class-wide proof of reliance,
however, may result in a less than complete satisfaction of the
compensation goal. Some investors who did not in any way rely on
the misrepresentations (and whose damages were not, therefore,
caused by reliance on the misrepresentations) may nevertheless be
compensated.5 6 However, the compensation goal is less frustrated
by compensation of some individuals who did not in any way rely
on the misrepresentations than it is by the complete denial of com-
pensation to those individuals who did in fact rely.
57
Under this "substantive compatibility analysis," the use of the
fraud-on-the-market theory's general mode of proving reliance en-
ables courts, to the greatest extent possible to realize the policy
goals at stake.58 Once the fraud-on-the-market theory is under-
stood in light of the substantive theory of class actions to merely
complexity of securities laws makes litigation expensive, "individual suits would not involve
sufficient losses to justify costs").
Id. at 364 (discussing necessity of class action device to correct "many actionable
wrongs" and recompense "affected persons").
5 If class certification is granted, despite the need for individualized proof of reliance,
the administrative costs of separate hearings on the issue of reliance would, in most situa-
tions, be prohibitive. Individualized proof of reliance would thus fail to satisfy the goal of
compensation to the same extent as would a general mode of proof. See Note, Class Action,
supra note 31, at 886-88 (where administrative costs so deplete the recovery fund that relief
to class members would be insignificant, compensation goal is thwarted and substantive
fairness of class suit is correspondingly reduced).
'0 Note, supra note 28, at 590. It is unlikely, however, that there will be very many
investors who did not rely on the integrity of the market. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
17 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 n.22 (remedial purposes of statute served "only by al-
lowing an overinclusive recovery to a defrauded class if the unavailability of the class device
renders the alternative a grossly underinclusive recovery"); see also Note, supra note 28, at
590-91 (in nondisclosure cases, "risk of overcompensation.., seems likely to be less signifi-
cant than the risk of undercompensation that would arise if proof of reliance were re-
quired"); cf. Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 882 (in products liability context, risk of
overdeterrence less significant than risk of underdeterrence).
Cf. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 n.22 (if right to rebuttal threatens subversion of class
action, it may be eliminated to effectuate purposes of statute).
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provide a means of proving reliance on a class-wide basis, courts
can more properly analyze various issues raised by allegations of a
fraud on the market and by the creation of a fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance. It is these issues that this Article next
addresses.
III. IssuEs RAISED BY THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY
A. Rebutting the Presumption of Reliance
Viewing the fraud-on-the-market theory as a vehicle for
adopting a rebuttable presumption of reliance on a misrepresenta-
tion, rather than as a vehicle for proving reliance on a class-wide
basis, leaves open the possibility that numerous individual issues
of reliance will have to be tried in a rule 10b-5 class action. De-
fendants may now seek to rebut the presumption of reliance by
proving that each class member bought the relevant security with-
out relying on the integrity of the market.59 Viewed from such a
conceptual framework, therefore, individual issues of reliance re-
main and the very raison d'etre for the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory in the securities class action context is vitiated.e ° The pre-
sumption of reliance endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic
merely shifts the focus of attention from whether an individual re-
lied on the misrepresentation to whether an individual relied on
the "integrity of the market." Reliance on the misrepresentation is
presumed only for those who relied on the "integrity of the mar-
ket"-that is, those investors who traded the relevant stock in reli-
ance on the integrity of the price set by the market. In keeping
with this shift in focus, it is now commonplace for defendants to
attack class certification by attempting to rebut the fraud-on-the-
" Basic, 485 U.S. at 248; see supra note 34; see also Berman v. Entertainment Mktg.,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,905, at 95,905 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
18, 1990) (raising question of how many members of plaintiff class must be shown not to
have relied on integrity of market "before the action may no longer be maintained as a
class"). More typically, defendants seek to rebut the presumption of reliance only for the
named plaintiff. If the named plaintiff is shown to be an unsatisfactory class representative
because he or she is not entitled to the presumption of reliance, and if no satisfactory class
member comes forward, defendants will be able to defeat a motion for class certification.
10 But see Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(rebuttal of presumption of reliance "is virtually impossible in all but the most extraordi-
nary case"); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 n.22 ("we doubt that a defendant would be able to
prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material
fraud").
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market presumption of reliance of a plaintiff on the ground that
the plaintiff did not rely on the "integrity of the market."''1
However, once it is recognized that, under the substantive the-
ory of class actions, the fraud on the market theory is a vehicle for
establishing reliance on a class-wide basis, all individual issues of
reliance are eliminated. Whether the class representative, or any
particular member of the class, individually relied on the misrepre-
sentation or on the integrity of the market is, and should be, irrele-
vant. The sole issue becomes whether the misrepresentation af-
fected the price of the security.
In sum, the fraud-on-the-market theory should not be used to
create a rebuttable presumption of reliance, but should be used as
a means of proving reliance on a class-wide basis. The usefulness of
the fraud-on-the-market theory in a class action context is not to
shift the focus of attention from reliance on the misrepresentation
to reliance on the price of the security or the integrity of the mar-
ket. Rather, the theory, in such a context, is best used to focus
attention on the fact that any adverse impact on the market price
of a security resulting from a misrepresentation demonstrates that
the investment community as a whole directly relied on the mis-
representation. The requisite causal connection between the mis-
representation and injury to the class can thus be established for
the class as a whole.
B. Choosing Between Reliance on the Misrepresentation and
Fraud on the Market
Courts have questioned whether a plaintiff who directly relies
on alleged misrepresentations is also entitled to the fraud-on-the-
market presumption. 2 A plaintiff must therefore choose between
the fraud on the market theory and a contention that statements
on which he directly relied were misleading. The two choices are
deemed to be "logically inconsistent. '63
Moreover, if the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
is seen to be in conflict with direct reliance on the misrepresenta-
tions, a plaintiff in a class action who is not entitled to the fraud-
on-the-market presumption may be deemed unable to represent a
class which includes members who are entitled to rely on the pre-
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
62 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63 See Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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sumption.64 Therefore, a claim of fraud on the market, alleged to
facilitate class certification, could have the unintended result of
preventing class certification.
This anomaly is eliminated if the fraud on the market theory
is understood in relation to the substantive theory of class actions.
In particular, if the alleged fraud on the market is seen solely as a
means of proving reliance on a class-wide basis, then the dichot-
omy between direct reliance by some members of the class and in-
direct reliance by other members of the class can be eliminated.
Properly viewed, there is no conflict between members who di-
rectly relied on a misrepresentation and class members who indi-'
rectly relied on the misrepresentation through their reliance on the
integrity of the market. Rather, all class members collectively
prove reliance on the misrepresentation by proving that it artifi-
cially inflated the price of the relevant stock.
C. Proof of a Fraud on the Market as a Precondition for Use of a
Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that the presumption of re-
liance created by the fraud on the market theory could be rebut-
ted, not only by proof that an individual plaintiff did not rely on
the integrity of the market price, but also by proof that the mis-
statement did not in fact affect the market price of the relevant
security." This holding reflects the notion that if a misstatement
did not affect the market price of the relevant security, it may be
reasonably inferred that the investment community as a whole did
not rely on the misstatement.
Defendants have argued that where the predomination re-
quirement of rule 23 is satisfied by resort to the fraud on the mar-
ket presumption of reliance, class certification may be denied if the
alleged misrepresentations are shown to have been made during a
time when accurate information was available to the investment
community from publicly available sources. 6 If accurate informa-
tion were available, it is contended, that there was no fraud on the
market and, therefore, that the class should not be permitted to
" See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. But see In re Data Access Systems
Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 139 & 142 (D.N.J. 1984) (factual differences in reliance insuffi-
cient to defeat class certification), rev'd on other grouk.ds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988).
'5 See supra note 34.
e See supra note 14.
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invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to obtain
class certification.
This argument, though perhaps appealing if the fraud on the
market theory is understood in terms of creating a presumption of
reliance, loses all its force when the fraud-on-the-market theory is
viewed as providing a way of proving reliance on a class-wide basis.
When seen in connection with class-wide proof of reliance, demon-
strating that a fraud on the market occurred becomes a substan-
tive matter for trial rather than a precondition for entitlement to a
presumption.
At least one court has in fact refused, on a motion for class
certification, to consider what weight to accord "curative informa-
tion" available in the market on the ground that such evidence is
not relevant at the class certification stage, but should be left to
the fact finder at trial." Courts have also ruled that whether there
has been a fraud on the market is a question which applies to all
class members and, thus, is itself a common question going to the
merits of the case. 8
IV. FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF STATE
LAW CLAIMS
Until recently, only federal courts have considered the appli-
cability of the fraud on the market theory to state law securities
claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation. In each instance,
the state law claims were pendent to claims under the federal se-
curities laws. Typically, federal courts analyzed the problem as re-
quiring an initial determination of whether the fraud on the mar-
ket theory had been adopted by the relevant state court.
Courts that have explicitly ruled on the question have found
that the relevant state court had not adopted the fraud-on-the-
market theory.69 Often this finding is conclusive; it is held that,
6 In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 641 (D.N.J. 1988); see also In re
Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989) (triable issue of fact existed
as to whether unqualified optimism of Apple's statements about its Twiggy computer were
materially misleading notwithstanding market's skepticism), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229
(1990).
68 Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333, 337-38 (D. Or. 1988) ("whether
plaintiffs will be able to travel on the presumptive reliance of the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory is itself a question that is common to and typical of the entire class"); In re IGI Sec.
Litig., 122 F.R.D. 451, 457 (D.N.J. 1988) (quoting Finkel v. O'Brien, No. 85-2539, slip op. at
9 (D.N.J. May 23, 1986)).
69 Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1163 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) ("no state courts have
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since the relevant state court had not adopted the fraud-on-the-
market theory, the theory is "not available" for use with state law
claims. The element of reliance is, therefore, an individual ques-
tion. 0 Other courts, without explicitly finding that the theory had
not been adopted, have concluded that pendent state law claims
require individual proof of reliance.71
Federal courts, holding that the element of reliance in pendent
state law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation is an
individual question, have, in some cases, concluded that individual
questions of reliance preclude class certification of the state law
claims. 2 In other cases, however, courts have understood that the
presence of such individual questions does not mean that individ-
adopted the theory"); Morse v. Abbott Laboratories, 756 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(plaintiff "points to no cases which apply the 'fraud on the market' theory to these state
claims"); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (no Califor-
nia state court "has specifically adopted the fraud on the market theory"); Hurley v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 27, 34 n.4 (D. Mass. 1989) ("no Massachusetts case has yet
endorsed the fraud on the market theory"); In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 125 F.R.D. 625, 636 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("fraud on the market ... theories of reli-
ance have not been developed in state courts"); Rosenberg v. Digilla, 648 F. Supp. 40, 43-44
(E.D. Pa. 1935) ("research reveals no state court decisions which have adopted a 'fraud on
the market' type theory of reliance"); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1537, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1991) ("no state court has applied the fraud-on-the-market theory to common
law fraud actions" (citing Peil 806 F.2d at 1163 n.17)).
It is not suprising that no state court has adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory. Un-
til Mirkin, no state court had ever dealt with the issue. See generally, MDC Holdings, 754
F. Supp. at 799-800 (discussing California courts' failure to consider fraud on the market as
"thereby circumventing the state forum").
70 Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 121 F.R.D. 642, 649 (M.D. Pa. 1988); ac-
cord In re 3 Commercial Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
% 95,270, at 96,210 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 279
(N.D. Tex. 1990); Victor v. White, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,548,
at 93,510 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 1989) (fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply to common
law fraud claims); Bexar County, 125 F.R.D. at 636; Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,
1297-98 (D.N.J. 1989) ("no judicial presumption of reliance may be interposed on pendent
state law claims"); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Rosen-
berg, 648 F. Supp. at 43-44.
71 See McMahon Brooks, Inc. v. Willow Grove Ass'n., 108 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(individual reliance must be established under common law fraud); see also Morse, 756 F.
Supp. at 1112 (common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation require "actual reli-
ance"); Good v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 751 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (common law
fraud requires each individual plaintiff to prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentation)
(quoting Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 412 (N.D. IlM. 1987)); Gruber, 117 F.R.D. at
81 (common law securities fraud requires proof of "direct reliance"); Hudson v. Capital
Management Int'l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 630 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (proof of individual reliance
necessary under California law) (distinguishing rebuttable presumption of reliance permit-
ted in Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964 (1971)).
712 See supra note 10.
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ual questions of law or fact predominate. The latter courts have,
accordingly, permitted class certification of the state law claims.73
Many federal courts go beyond a simple determination that
the relevant state court had not adopted the fraud on the market
theory. They additionally have considered whether the relevant
state court would adopt the fraud-on-the-market theory.74 This
second step determination has resulted in conflicting findings.
Thus, for example, some federal courts have suggested that Cali-
fornia state courts would apply the fraud-on-the-market theory. 6
Other federal courts have found the opposite.76
Recently, the Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate
District, in Mirkin v. Wasserman,7 considered the applicability of
the fraud-on-the-market theory to state law claims in a securities
class action; it concluded that the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion of reliance does not apply under California law for fraud and
deceit, negligent misrepresentation, or violation of section 1507 of
California's Corporations Code. In upholding the dismissal of the
securities class action brought under such California law, the
Mirkin Court stressed that "reliance is a common element required
under each cause of action for fraud and deceit, negligent misrep-
resentation, or violation of Section 1507.578 The court refused to
permit the element of reliance in such state law causes of action to
be established by employing the fraud-on-the-market theory:
"While federal courts apply the fraud-on-the-market theory in rule
10b-5 actions, the considerations which apply there do not control
fraud and misrepresentation causes of action based on California
law."M9
' See supra note 11.
Cytryn v. Cook, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 95,409, at 97,018
(N.D. Cal. July 2, 1990); In re Consolidated Capital Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,238 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1990); Hurley, 719 F. Supp. at 34 n.4.
Still other courts, without determining what the state courts would do, choose to adopt
the fraud on the market presumption of reliance for state law claims so long as the relevant
state court has not forbid its use. Ramtek Sec. Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,483, at 97,519-20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1990); Minpeco, 718 F. Supp. at 176.
11 MDC Holdings, 754 F. Supp. at 803; Ramtek Sec. Litig., 95,483, at 97,520; In re
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,485, at 93,087-
88 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 1989), ("that the 'fraud-on-the-market' theory has not been directly
utilized in California to date does not imply that it is contrary to California law").
" Cytryn, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 95,409, at 97,018.
" 227 Cal. App. 3d 1537, 278 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1991).
78 Mirkin, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
79 Id. at 738.
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The Mirkin Court first distinguished application of the fraud-
on-the-market theory in Rule 10b-5 class actions from its applica-
tion in securities class actions under state law on the ground that
the purpose of the federal securities laws is "to rectify perceived
deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establish-
ing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry."80 Then,
the Mirkin Court found that adoption of the fraud-on-the-market
theory to state law causes of action would "eviscerate[ ] the reli-
ance requirement" of such causes of action."1 According to Judge
Ortega, who authored the opinion, the fraud-on-the-market theory,
if adopted, "would eliminate California's reliance requirement and
thus work a change in our substantive law."82 The court was not
impressed with the plaintiffs' argument that refusal to adopt the
fraud-on-the-market theory would enable defendants to escape lia-
bility for fraud. "Abhor[ance of] the type of misconduct alleged in
the complaint," wrote Judge Ortega, was not "justification for ob-
literating the reliance requirement from California law."83
10 Id. at 741; see Consolidated Capital, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 95,238 (Supreme Court's dicta, that Rule 10b-5 actions add to protections of common law
fraud, used to justify conclusion that latter require actual reliance). But see Minpeco, S.A. v.
Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 176 (simply because Supreme Court dicta states that federal securi-
ties laws "add to the protections of common law fraud" does not mean that common-law
fraud cannot encompass actions based on fraud on the market); see also In re Activision
Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (because similarities between Rule 10b-5
actions and common law fraud outnumber differences, class certification of pendent state
law claims permitted).
81 Mirkin, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
82 Id. at 744.
11 Id. at 745. Ortega's belief that the fraud on the market presumption would obliterate
the reliance requirement from California law was greatly influenced by Justice White's con-
curring and dissenting opinion in Basic. Id. at 742-43 (expressing "uncertainty over the va-
lidity of the efficient market thesis which underlies the fraud on the market theory"). Ac-
cording to Justice White, quoted at length by Judge Ortega, even if investors, in buying and
selling securities, rely on the price of the securities, investors do not always presume that a
security's price is a reflection of the security's "true value". Id. at 742 (quoting Basic, 485
U.S. at 255-57).
The objections to the fraud on the market theory raised by Justice White were found
by Judge Ortega to be "weighty" and "persuasive in arguing against its application here."
Id. Thus, it is significant that, as one commentator has stated, the points raised in Basic by
Justice White "are correct but have nothing to do with the fraud on the market theory."
Fischel, supra note 4, at 920.
The theory does not posit that there is some "true value" of an asset other than
its price. On the contrary, the theory assumes that the market price is the best
indicia of value which makes it all the more important that this price not be dis-
torted by fraudulent information.
Id.
The presumption of reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory does not assume
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The decisions in Mirkin, as well as the numerous federal court
decisions involving application of the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption of reliance to state law claims, fail to consider the fraud-
on-the-market theory in connection with a substantive theory of
class actions. When so considered, it can be seen that (i) use of the
fraud-on-the-market theory by state courts would not "obliterate"
the reliance requirement of state law causes of action, and (ii) fed-
eral courts may employ the fraud-on-the-market theory for pen-
dent state law claims regardless of whether the relevant state court
has done so.
Under the substantive theory of class actions, the fraud on the
market theory is not employed as an alternative to proof of reli-
ance. Rather, it is used to satisfy the element of reliance on a class-
wide basis. Thus, the reliance element is clearly not "obliterated."
Moreover, as in rule 10b-5 cases, the class-wide proof of reliance is
available, under the substantive theory of class actions, if and only
if its use furthers the underlying policy goals of the relevant cause
of action. The remedial policy objectives of state law causes of ac-
tion for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are substantially
the same as the remedial policy objectives of a rule 10b-5 cause of
action;84 and the reliance element serves substantially the same
purpose in such state law causes of action as in a rule 10b-5 cause
of action. 5 Therefore, the analysis which justifies use of the fraud-
that investors equate the price of a security with its true value. Rather, it assumes that
investors who rely on the price of a security having been validly set indirectly rely on mis-
representations and omissions which distort that price. Therefore, the fraud on the market
presumption of reliance provides a type of indirect causal connection between the misrepre-
sentations and omissions and the investors' injury that Judge Ortega accepts in other con-
texts. See Mirkin, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 737. Judge Ortega stated that no causal connection
existed in Mirkin because the complaint did not allege "any relationship or communication
between the plaintiffs and the more informed followers of the stock market who received the
defendants' alleged misrepresentations." Id. However, so long as the misrepresentations are
alleged to have artificially inflated the price of the security, a relationship is alleged.
" See Rosenblum v. Adler, 261 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (allowing injured party to recover
damages from independent auditor's negligent misrepresentation shifts loss from innocent
creditor or investor to wrongdoer thereby deterring instances in which liability would en-
sue); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Mis-
representation, 20 S. DIEGO L. REv. 233, 260 (1983) (imposing liability on accountant for
negligent misrepresentation serves "dual functions of compensation for injury and deter-
rence of negligent conduct). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs, §§ 2 & 4, at 6 &
23 (4th ed. 1971). Tort law concerns itself with the allocation of losses arising out of human
activities; courts consider the need not only to compensate the ictim, but also to admonish
and deter the wrongdoer. See id.
85 See W. PROSSER, supra note 84, § 108, at 714 (reliance necessary to establish "causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the resulting damage"). See generally Note,
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on-the-market theory to prove reliance on class-wide basis in rule
10b-5 cases, applies solely to cases involving only state law causes
of action."
The classwide proof of reliance permitted by the fraud-on-the-
market theory, and justified by the substantive theory of class ac-
tions, remains entirely a procedural mechanism. Use of a general
mode of proof affects no substantive right. Therefore, federal
courts may employ the fraud on the market theory to permit class-
wide proof of reliance in pendent state law claims regardless of
whether the relevant state court has specifically adopted the fraud-
on-the-market theory.57
V. CONCLUSION
One of the elements of a private cause of action under rule
10b-5 is reliance. Courts have recognized that to permit individual
issues of reliance to defeat class certification in a class action under
rule 10b-5 would frustrate private enforcement of the federal se-
curities laws. Accordingly, in order to prevent individual issues of
reliance from precluding class certification, courts have used the
fraud-on-the-market theory to create a rebuttable presumption of
Class Action, supra note 31, at 873-77.
88 Cf. Atlantic Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,644 at 97,991 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1990) (reasoning justifying fraud on the market
presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 action "no less persuasive in a negligent misrepresen-
tation case"); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (pre-
sumption of reliance in consumer fraud class action, like fraud on the market presumption
of reliance, facilitates use of class action device); see also Note, Class Action, supra note 31,
at 875 (to further remedial policy of common law fraud actions courts have been receptive
to general modes of proving reliance).
87 Cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 117 (1968).
Because Rule 19(b) does not alter substantive rights, it is not beyond the rulemaking power
of the Rules Enabling Act. See id.; Note, Class Action, supra note 31, at 885 n.127; see also
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966).
If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system,
they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide
complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits. Rule 23(b), like the other
civil rules, was written to further, not defeat, the ends of justice.
Id.
Moreover, principles of judicial economy require that pendent state law claims arising
out of the same wrongdoing as federal securities law claims be litigated in a single forum.
See In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (class treatment of
both federal and state claims will permit efficient presentation of proof on overlapping is-
sues); In re Victor Tech. Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53, 59 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (individual questions
for state common law claims did not predominate because some proof to be introduced in
federal securities law claims will be relevant to state law claims).
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reliance.
Unfortunately, this rebuttable presumption has not fully pre-
vented defendants from returning to the issue of reliance in an ef-
fort to defeat class certification. Among other tactics, defendants
have contended either that the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance because the
plaintiff did not rely on the integrity of the market, or that the
class as a whole is not entitled to invoke the fraud on the market
presumption of reliance because accurate information was availa-
ble in the market. Moreover, some courts have indicated a willing-
ness to limit classes in circumstances in which the reliance of some
members of the class was direct while the reliance of others was
indirect. Other courts have refused class certification of state law
claims on the belief that the fraud on the market theory is not
available.
This Article has suggested that the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory is most satisfactorily and appropriately viewed in the context
of a substantive theory of class actions. In this context, the fraud-
on-the-market theory provides a means of determining the issue of
reliance on a class-wide basis. All efforts to defeat class certifica-
tion by returning to individual issues of reliance, or by asserting
conflicts between class members based on the manner of reliance,
are thereby eviscerated. This general mode of determining reliance
is fully justified on the basis of the remedial and structural policy
goals underlying both a rule 10b-5 private right of action and a
state law claim for fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
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